CASE COMMENTARIES
BANKRUPTCY
Creditors cannot revive discharged claim in a subsequent Chapter 12 case. In
re Myers, 284 B.R. 478 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2002).
By C. Mark Anderson
The Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appeals Panel held that a creditor holding a
claim discharged in a prior Chapter 7 case cannot assert that claim for purposes of
setoff in a subsequent Chapter 12 case.
In In re Myers, the debtors owed the United States Department of Agriculture
(the “USDA”) a sizeable sum of money. The loan was secured by liens on the
debtors’ land and other assets. The loan went into default, and the USDA
commenced foreclosure proceedings. The debtors filed a Chapter 12 petition, which
was converted to a Chapter 7 petition. Pursuant to section 727 of the Bankruptcy
Code, the debtors were granted a discharge. The USDA then proceeded to
prosecute its foreclosure complaint in the United States District Court, receiving a
judgment against the debtors.
The debtors then filed a second Chapter 12 petition. The debtors and the
USDA agreed that the debtors were authorized to enroll in farm related payment
programs. The USDA claimed that it had not waived its rights to setoff or to recoup
its prior claims against any amounts that became payable to the debtors as a result of
the programs. In order to setoff payments made to the debtors against the original
claims that the USDA had in Chapter 7, the USDA moved to lift the automatic stay.
Both the trial court and the Appeals Panel agreed that this was an issue of
interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code and that “when the debtors’ Chapter 7
discharge was entered, it discharged them from ‘all debts that arose before the date
of the order for relief under this chapter.’” Once a debt is discharged, the creditor’s
right to payment ceases to exist. The USDA argued that its right to setoff survived
the discharge, because the discharge only acts to erase the debtors’ personal liability
and not in rem liability. However, the court dismissed this contention by pointing out
that an in rem claim was not at issue.
This decision should act to remind practitioners of the power of the Chapter
7 discharge and its so-called “Chapter 19” cases in which a debtor files a Chapter 7
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case, receives its discharge, and then files a Chapter 12 case to address debts, such as
secured claims with a Chapter 12 plan, not discharged in the Chapter 7 case. A
Chapter 7 discharge effectively wipes out the creditors right to further payment for
all discharged debts. Thus, the creditor’s claim cannot be revived by the filing of a
subsequent petition for bankruptcy by the debtor.
______
Debtor loses ownership in collateral upon repossession despite filing
subsequent petition for relief. In re Kalter, 292 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2002).
By Jason P. Jeffreys
Applying Florida statutory law, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held
that upon repossession of collateral prior to a debtor’s filing of bankruptcy,
ownership of collateral passes to the repossessing creditor, even if the creditor has
not obtained a certificate of title in its name.
In In re Kalter, the debtors sued the creditors seeking turnover under 11
U.S.C. § 542 of their respective vehicles, which the creditors had repossessed prior to
the petition date. The bankruptcy court held for the debtors, reasoning along the
lines of U.S. v. Whiting Pools that because a vehicle is “property of the debtor’s
estate,” a third party creditor could be ordered to return the property to the debtor’s
possession.
On first appeal, the U.S. District Court of the Middle District of Florida
focused its attention on whether the vehicles were actually part of the debtor’s
bankruptcy estate after repossession. Examining various Florida statues, the court
concluded that the vehicles were no longer property of the debtors’ estates because
ownership transferred to the respective creditors upon repossession. The Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
In reaching its conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit looked to sources of Florida
law that related to the rights and obligations of a secured creditor repossessing a
vehicle, notably section 319.28 of the Florida Certificate of Title Statute. This statute
expressly recognizes that ownership in a repossessed vehicle is transferred to a
creditor upon repossession. Therefore, the debtors automatically lost their
ownership interests the moment the repossession occurred. Further, the court noted
that this statute also allows ownership to be retained by the creditor despite its failure
to obtain either a certificate of title or certificate of repossession before the
bankruptcy filings.
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This case emphasizes the effects of the Butner principal: Questions of what
constitutes property of the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541, which property must be
turned over to the debtor or the trustee upon bankruptcy, are governed by nonbankruptcy law. Just as that non-bankruptcy law may seem to provide the debtor
with more leeway, however, that law may be drafted to reverse this result and protect
secured creditors from the prospect of post-repossession loss of the collateral in a
subsequent bankruptcy case.
COMMERCIAL
CD characterized as common law pledge instead of UCC certificate of
deposit. Nat'l City Bank v. Toffel, 292 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2002).
By Kimberly M. Jones
Applying Kentucky law, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that
funds deposited as a certificate of deposit (“CD”) and used to secure credit were a
common law pledge rather than a negotiable instrument governed by Kentucky’s
version of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) for failure to meet definitional
requirements, and thus subject to the pledgee’s disposal.
National City Bank of Kentucky (“NCB”) issued a letter of credit to the
Alabama Land & Mineral Corporation (“Alabama Land”) in favor of Van-American
Insurance Company (“Van-American”) in the amount of $1,000,000. NCB and
Alabama Land then entered into a Reimbursement and Security Agreement
(“Agreement”) whereby Alabama Land agreed to repay NCB should Van-American
draw upon the line of credit. Meanwhile, Alabama Land and its parent company,
Mid-South Resources Corporation (“Mid-south”), opened an escrow account with
NCB to store the subject funds for the Agreement. The escrow account provided
Alabama Land and Mid-South with the right to request investment of the subject
funds in a CD. Mid-South subsequently requested investment of the subject funds
in a CD, which was created by NCB. However, NCB never issued a certificate to
represent the CD.
Three years later, Alabama Land and Mid-South petitioned for bankruptcy.
Within two years of filing, Van-American drew upon the $1,000,000 previously
established line of credit. Based on the Agreement between NCB and Alabama Land,
NCB requested the Trustee of Alabama Land’s bankruptcy estate (“Trustee”) to pay
the $1,000,000 Van-American drew from the line of credit plus a fee for drawing the
funds. The Trustee refused to pay the requested amount, and as a result, NCB paid
Van-American $1,000,000 and retained the CD as payment.
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Nevertheless, both a bankruptcy and district court placed an automatic stay
over the CD, thus preventing NCB from retaining the fund as repayment. NCB then
appealed to the Eleventh Circuit seeking relief from the automatic stay to apply the
CD to the pre-petition obligations of Alabama Land and Mid-South set forth in the
Agreement. The issue for determination was whether the funds in dispute could be
characterized as a deposit account or as a CD.
Kentucky has long held the view that when determining the rights and
liabilities of parties, it is the substance of a transaction rather than form that controls
interpretation. Moreover, under Kentucky law, K.R.S. § 355.3-104(10), an adoption
of Article 9 of the UCC, the only method of perfecting an interest in a negotiable
instrument, such as a CD, is through possession.
In applying these principles, the Eleventh Circuit found that the substance of
the transaction was the extension of a line of credit by NCB to Alabama Land in
consideration for a security interest in the subject funds. Despite arguments by the
Trustee that the substance of the transaction was altered when Alabama Land
requested and NCB invested the subject funds in a CD, the court held that the
substance of the transaction had not changed; that NCB did not relinquish its
security interest in the subject funds by investing them in a CD.
Noting that a written certificate, which is required by the definition of a
negotiable instrument, did not evidence the CD, the court could not characterize the
subject funds as a CD under Kentucky’s version of Article 9 of the UCC. Since this
body of law did not apply, the court looked to the common law of Kentucky to
characterize the funds. The court found that the funds would be more properly
characterized as a pledge, meaning a “transfer of property as security for a debt.”
The Eleventh Circuit then noted that in Mechanics’ & Traders’ Ins. Co. v Kiger,
103 U.S. 352, 356 (1880), the Supreme Court defined the elements required to make
a pledge as “(1) debt; (2) the offer of property to secure the debt, and (3) the transfer
of the property from the debtor (pledgor) to the creditor (pledgee).” Applying the
facts of the case to the required definitions, the court found that (1) Alabama Land
incurred debt when NCB extended the $1,000,000 line of credit to Alabama Land in
favor of Van-American; (2) Alabama Land (through Mid-South) offered the subject
funds as security; and (3) Alabama Land (through Mid-South) transferred the subject
funds to NCB.
Based on its findings, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized two points. First, the
court noted that, conceptually and physically, Alabama Land’s debt and Mid-South’s
278

pledge were two different items. Second, the universal rule regarding pledges of
personal property as security for debt is that to create a lien, possession of the item
pledged, whether actually or symbolically, must be delivered by the pledgor to the
pledgee. If however, the item pledged remains in the control of the pledgor, the
item has not been delivered and cannot be in the pledgee’s possession. Applying this
rule, the court held that Alabama Land relinquished control over the subject funds
when they were deposited to NCB under the terms of the escrow account. Alabama
Land only could “request” that the subject funds be invested, but all other control of
the funds rested solely with NCB. Thus, the court held that possession of the funds
had been transferred to NCB, and therefore, the subject funds were pledged by
Alabama Land as security for the letter of credit.
The lesson to transactional attorneys here is fundamental, but it obviously
bears repeating. While the UCC applies to most commercial transactions, it only
applies when transactions meet the requirements established by the UCC. If
transactions, such as the funds in this case, do not meet the applicable requirements
of the UCC, they may fall victim to common law interpretation.
______
Fast cash lending service bound by the requirements of the Truth in Lending
Act. Jump v. ACP Enters., 224 F. Supp 2d 1216 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 16, 2002).
By Mary L. Morris
Applying federal law, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Indiana held that a lender had violated the Truth in Lending Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1683, (“TILA”) for failing to accurately convey a security interest it had
taken and for failing to accurately portray the property in which the interest was
taken.
ACP Enterprises (“ACP”) specialized in making high interest loans with
short-term payback periods to various customers throughout northern Indiana. The
loan amounts were usually small in value but required that the customer pay a high
annual percentage rate (“APR”) to receive the money. As a result, the APRs on the
loans were well beyond the allowable finance charges under Indiana law. In addition
to the high finance charges, the loan customers were required to leave a post-dated
check with ACP in exchange for the loan amount. At the end of the loan term,
which was usually two weeks, ACP had the option to cash the checks if the
customers had not paid the loan.
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In Jump v. ACP Eterprises, Inc., the court had to determine whether a postdated check must be disclosed under TILA, whether ACP’s disclosure of the APR in
agreements violated TILA, and whether the consumer loan agreements between
ACP and its customers were governed by TILA and Regulation Z (codified as 12
C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(25)).
The court held that the loan agreements between ACP and its customers fell
under the regulations of TILA and Regulation Z. In reaching its conclusion, the
court looked to the language of both TILA and Regulation Z, which state, in
pertinent part, that a creditor is required to accurately convey a security interest taken
by a lender and to accurately portray the property in which the interest is taken.
Likewise, Regulation Z defines “security interest” as “an interest in property that
secures performance of a consumer credit obligation and that is recognized by state
or federal law.”
The court held that the loan agreements between ACP and the customers fell
under the regulations of TILA and Regulation Z based on the definitions and
language found in the regulations. In its analysis, the court noted that the security
interest created was not the usual security interest created in most transactions of this
kind because the post-dated check did not impart an independent value separate
from the amount already owed by customer. The court did, however, note that a
post-dated check created additional extrinsic value to the transaction. Moreover,
post-dated checks taken from customers by ACP represented an additional avenue
by which ACP could secure payment, which is similar to usual Article 9 transactions.
As a result, the court found that the criteria for attachment and enforceability of a
security interest had been met and that the security interest should have been
disclosed under TILA.
This decision highlights the importance of understanding the relevant laws
and statutes regarding a business entity. While transactional attorneys should not
offer clients advice regarding business decisions, they should be mindful of the laws
that pertain to their clients’ decisions and should advise clients to follow the
applicable laws accordingly.
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CONTRACTS
Party sophistication influences court’s analysis of disputed terms in recording
agreement. FurryRecords, Inc. v. RealNetworks, Inc., 01 Civ. 10998 (JSR), 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 16272 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
By Isaac Conner
When two sophisticated parties enter into a licensing agreement, courts will
rely on the language of that agreement to interpret each party’s rights under the
agreement. Such was the situation presented in FurryRecords, Inc. v. RealNetworks, Inc.
In FurryRecords, the plaintiff, Hanna Bentley, and her personal company,
FurryRecords, Inc., entered into a licensing agreement with a music promotion
company named, The Orchard, LLC (“Orchard”). Bentley is a graduate of Columbia
Law School, and represented her company in this action. Her duties with the
company included artist, President, and principal shareholder.
On September 3, 1999, both parties entered into a licensing agreement that
stated that Orchard could nonexclusively
sell, distribute, and otherwise exploit any and all of the recordings by
any means and media, including, without limitation, the non-exclusive
rights to sell, distribute and otherwise exploit any and all of [Ms.
Bentley’s] Recordings throughout E-stores including, but not limited
to those via the Internet, as well as digital storage, download and
transmission rights, whether now known or existing in the future.
Bentley later learned that Orchard was making MP3 copies of her recordings,
and on July 24, 2001, she sent a letter to Orchard demanding that copying cease.
Bentley then brought suit against Orchard arguing that: (1) Orchard’s MP3 copying
constituted copyright infringement; (2) that the license agreement was
unconscionable; and (3) that the license agreement was terminable at will. The
district court interpreted parties’ licensing agreement based on New York law and
the language expressed in the agreement.
Bentley’s primary argument was that the license agreement did not expressly
provide for “copying” per se, therefore, any copying done by the defendant was
copyright infringement. The court disagreed with this interpretation based on
specific language expressed in the agreement. The agreement used phrases, such as,
“rights to sell, distribute and otherwise exploit any and all of your Recordings by any
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and all means and media,” and these means of exploitation included “[I]nternet, as
well as digital storage, download and transmission rights, whether now known or
existing in the future.” The court interpreted such language as an open-ended right
for Orchard to exploit the recordings. The court also focused on the language
“whether now known or existing in the future” as the overwhelming evidence as to
why MP3 copying, a new technology, was valid under the agreement.
Bentley’s secondary argument was that the agreement was unconscionable.
She claimed that the one-year period that the defendant would promote the
recordings was inherently unreasonable because the defendant had a right in
perpetuity to sell, distribute, and otherwise exploit the recordings. The court held
that there was nothing inherently unreasonable about a promoter agreeing to
promote an unknown artist for non-exclusive rights to exploit the works. Moreover,
under 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3), Bentley has a statutory right to terminate the contract
after 35 years; therefore, the agreement was conscionable. Additionally, the court
considered both parties sophisticated. Bentley, a graduate from Columbia Law
School, was not mislead or coerced into agreeing to the terms at issue. She reviewed
and voluntarily signed the agreement.
Finally, Bentley argued that the agreement was terminable-at-will. Under
New York law, contracts are terminable-at-will if: (1) there is no fixed “or
determinable” duration to the overall contract; and (2) there is no express agreement
that the duration is perpetual. The court held that the agreement expressly provided
the Orchard rights in perpetuity that were terminable only with mutual consent.
Furthermore, since federal law establishes the right to terminate copyrights after 35
years, the contract was not terminable at will.
FurryRecords is a good lesson for any transactional attorney in closely
reviewing contracts before endorsing. The court used the four-corners test to
interpret the agreement. Here the plaintiff, who was not only the attorney, but also
an artist, may have done herself a disservice by not using outside counsel. Her
dreams of becoming a music sensation may have clouded her judgment as a legal
practitioner.
______
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Employment agreement providing judicial remedies for disputes supercedes
asset purchase agreement’s arbitration clause. Frounfelker v. Identity Group, Inc.,
No. M2001-02542-COA-R3-CV, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 390 (Tenn Ct. App.
2002).
By Patrick V. Fiel, Jr.
A Tennessee appellate court denied a company’s motion to compel
arbitration of a dispute arising out of an Employment Agreement. Though
Tennessee courts generally construe any arbitration agreements in favor of
compelling the arbitration of disputes, in Frounfelker v. Identity Group, Inc., the
appellate court found that the parties did not intend an arbitration clause to govern a
claim for early termination.
Identity Group, Inc. (“Identity”) motioned to compel David Frounfelker
(“Frounfelker”) to arbitrate his claim of early termination. The parties initially
contracted for Frounfelker to sell his company to Identity. As part of the agreement,
Frounfelker would transfer his company’s assets to Identity while Identity would hire
Frounfelker for a one-year term. The parties executed an Asset Purchase Agreement
containing an arbitration clause providing that “any dispute, controversy, or claim
arising out of, relating to, or in connection with, the Asset Purchase Agreement shall
be finally settled by binding arbitration.” Simultaneously, Identity and Frounfelker
executed an Employment Agreement governing Frounfelker’s term of employment.
The Employment Agreement contained several provisions providing judicial
remedies in the event of a breach by either party.
The Employment Agreement stated that Frounfelker’s term of employment
was to end on the twelve-month anniversary of the Commencement Date, listed as
March 15, 2000. On March 14, 2001, Identity and Frounfelker mutually agreed to
extend the employment term one (1) additional week. After failing to negotiate a
renewal agreement, Frounfelker’s employment ended on March 21, 2001.
Frounfelker then filed a complaint claiming that he was terminated prior to the
twelve-month anniversary of his Commencement Date. Frounfelker asserted that
the agreed upon Commencement Date was April 1, 2000, his first day of
employment with Identity following the close of the asset sale on March 31, 2000.
Identity moved the trial court to dismiss the complaint and to order
Frounfelker to arbitrate his claim as mandated by the Asset Purchase Agreement.
Despite Tennessee’s strong presumption in favor of arbitration of disputes, the trial
court denied Identity’s motion. The appellate court affirmed under a de novo review
(contract interpretation is a matter of law).
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The appellate court applied Tennessee law in interpreting the contracts,
stating that the key principle was to ascertain the intention of the parties and give
effect to that intention. The appellate court held that the arbitration clause found in
the Asset Purchase agreement failed to reach the parties’ dispute in this case. The
appellate court noted that the hiring date itself, derived from the Asset Purchase
Agreement, was not in dispute, but that the dispute at hand was whether Identity had
terminated Frounfelker’s employment prematurely in violation of the Employment
Agreement. The appellate court focused on the factual underpinnings of the claim
holding that it was clear that the parties intended for disputes arising out of the
Employment Agreement to be decided in a judicial forum.
It is well established that parties cannot be forced to arbitrate claims that they
did not agree to arbitrate. A state’s presumption in favor of arbitration will not
supercede a part’s right to judicial remedies. Contracting arbitration and judicial
remedy clauses carefully is paramount to obtaining the appropriate forum desired for
dispute resolution.
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
In-house counsel may bring retaliatory discharge suit when termination
results from compliance with public policy provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Crews v. Buckman Labs. Int’l, Inc., 78 S.W.3d 852 (Tenn.
2002).
By Ennica Street
Deciding an issue of first impression, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that
attorneys who are employed by a corporation may sue under the common law for
retaliatory discharge resulting from the attorneys’ compliance with ethical obligations
that are rooted in public policy. Additionally, the Tennessee Supreme Court added a
provision to Tennessee Disciplinary Rule 4-101(c) that allows in-house counsel to
reveal client information when the lawyer believes the information is necessary to the
lawyer’s claim or defense in a dispute between the attorney and client, who is also the
corporation.
The plaintiff, Julia Beth Crews, worked for Buckman Laboratories
International, Inc., as associate general counsel. She learned that Buckman’s General
Counsel, Katherine Davis, did not have a Tennessee license to practice law.
Buckman Laboratories attempted to correct the defect internally, but after Ms. Davis
failed to fulfill the requirements necessary for a Tennessee license, the plaintiff
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reported her for the unauthorized practice of law to the Tennessee Board of Law
Examiners. Subsequently, Ms. Davis caused the plaintiff considerable difficulty in
performing her job. The plaintiff filed suit, claiming “constructive termination” after
her computer was taken and she was forced to take personal leave.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff had not stated a claim
upon which relief could be granted, reasoning that a claim by in-house counsel of
retaliatory discharge was unnecessary and potentially damaging to the attorney-client
relationship. The Tennessee Supreme Court, however, recognized that competing
interests exist between the ethical obligations of the attorney under the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the “benefits and responsibilities” provided by the
corporation to its employees. Lawyers often choose between compliance with the
ethical rules and loyalty to the corporation that employs them. As a result, the
corporation should not be allowed to penalize the lawyer for complying with his
ethical obligations.
This case highlights the importance of a lawyer’s ethical obligations in the
practice of her profession. The Tennessee Supreme Court validated a lawyer’s right
to sue his corporate employer for termination resulting from actions taken pursuant
to professional ethical obligations.
PROPERTY
Grantor must bind heirs and assigns of grantees for covenants to run with
land. Tennsco Corp. v. Attea, No. M2001-01378-COA-R3-CV, 2002 Tenn. App. Lexis
423, No. 27393 2002 WL 1298808 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 13, 2002).
By Newman Bankston
Applying Tennessee law, the Tennessee Court of Appeals analyzed the
validity of property restrictions, at law and in equity, by analyzing the intention of the
covenanting parties as manifested in the covenants which they administered. The
court held that “real covenants” at law do not run with the land unless the covenant
specifically binds the heirs and assigns of the grantees. Furthermore, “equitable
servitudes” or “reciprocal negative easements” in equity do not run with the land
unless the grantor creates a development plan or sales brochure for the property
which benefits all the restricted property.
Mr. and Mrs. Daughtery conveyed property on the north and south sides of
their historic home in Williamson County, Tennessee to Mr. Wills. The conveyance
stipulated that “any building constructed on the land shall be a single family dwelling
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of traditional design at least 4,000 square feet in size and on lots of one (1) acre or
greater in size.” Mr. Wills subsequently quit-claimed the property to the Mallory
Park, L.P., subject “to all restrictions, easements, and encumbrances or (sic) record.”
Mallory Park, L.P. then conveyed the property to Tennsco Corporation by warranty
deed. Contemporaneously, the Daughtery’s conveyed their home and their
remaining property unrestricted to the Butters, who subsequently conveyed the
home and property unrestricted to Mr. Attea. Tennsco Corporation brought suit
against Mr. Attea to clear its clouded title.
Both the trial court and the court of appeals awarded summary judgment to
Tennsco Corporation holding that a covenant does not run with the land unless: (1)
the covenant touches and concerns the land; (2) the original covenanting parties
intended for the covenant to run with the land; and (3) a privity of estate exists at law
or the successor of interest had “notice” of the covenant in equity. At law and in
equity, the covenants did not pass the second requirement of this established test.
At law, the covenants did not specifically bind the heirs and assigns of the grantees.
Furthermore, in equity, the grantor did not have a general plan or scheme of
development evidenced by a map or sales brochure, or the intention that the
restrictive covenants benefit all the property involved.
This decision explores the requirements for covenants to run with land
conveyed by private parties. For a covenant to run with the land at law, the
covenant must specifically bind the heirs and assigns of the grantees. In the same
way, in equity, the grantor must appear to have had in mind a general plan or scheme
of development and intended that the covenant benefit all the property involved.
______
Benefiting from confidential relationship with grantor creates presumption of
undue influence. Watson v. Ashley, No. M2001-00668-COA-R3-CV, 2002 Tenn.
App. LEXIS 422 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).
By Jimmy Summerlin
In Watson v. Ashley, the Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed a decision by
the Circuit Court of Franklin County setting aside a deed acquired by persons in a
confidential relationship with a grantor of limited education and cognitive ability.
In Watson, the plaintiff, Charles Watson, was a tenant-in-common with his
brother, Clyde, and mother in an eighty-five acre farm in Franklin County. The
plaintiff’s mother dies in 1987 and devised her interest in the farm to her two sons in
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equal shares. Subsequently, in 1993, Charles, who functions mentally at a six year old
level and cannot read, was asked by his sister, Margaret, and Clyde to accompany
them to an attorney’s office to execute “some papers related to their mother’s
estate.” In fact, the siblings had Charles execute a deed conveying his interest in the
property to Clyde and a will devising two-thirds of his property to his brother. If
Clyde should predecease Charles, the will provided that Clyde’s share would pass to
Margaret’s children. At the same meeting, Charles also executed an unrestricted
power of attorney naming Margaret as attorney-in-fact.
Clyde died in 1999 leaving a will devising a life estate in the farm to his wife
and a vast majority of the remainder interest to two of Margaret’s children. Charles
then brought this action to set aside the deed alleging that it “was procured by fraud,
by undue influence, or by trick, relying on his limited education and
comprehension.” The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court’s findings that
both Margaret and Clyde were in confidential relationships with Charles, that each
had profited from the conveyance, and that the presumption of undue influence was
not overcome by the evidence presented.
Under Tennessee law, a presumption of undue influence is created when a
party in a confidential relationship with the grantor benefits from a transaction with
the grantor. Here, the court found that Margaret was in a confidential relationship
because of her power as attorney-in-fact for Charles. Despite the fact that Margaret
never exercised the power, she knew of the power, was present when it was
executed, and testified at length about how she took care of Charles. The court also
found Clyde to be in a confidential relationship with Charles based on substantial
testimony that Clyde and Charles were in the farming business together and that,
because of Charles’ limited abilities, Clyde made all the business decisions. Given
Charles’ limited education and cognitive abilities, the court apparently had no
problem finding that Margaret and Clyde had exercised dominion and control over
Charles.
SECURITIES
Tennessee Supreme Court applies Hawaii Market test to define “investment
contract” under the Tennessee Securities Act of 1980. King v. Pope, 91 S.W.3d
314 (Tenn. 2002).
By Ryan Malone
To better define the term “investment contract,” as used in the definition of
“security” in the Tennessee Securities Act of 1980, the Supreme Court of Tennessee
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chose to utilize the Hawaii Market test, a definitional test used in many states to
identify an investment contract. This test’s four factors can be construed liberally,
thus allowing the courts to use Tennessee’s “Blue Sky” laws to protect the public
against schemes that may circumvent the Howey-Forman test, which is typically used
to identify an investment contract for purposes of the federal securities law
definition of a security.
John King, a licensed securities agent, was enlisted by Quarter Call, Inc.
(“QCI”) to market a pay telephone sale-leaseback program. QCI agreed to sell
phones to interested participants, and the participants would then lease the phones
back to QCI. According to the promotional materials used by King and QCI, the
participants would receive a fixed eighteen percent annual return. Under the
agreement, any losses incurred by QCI or revenues generated by the phones would
not be shared with participants, nor would the participants be responsible for any
expenses related to the phones. The lease agreement could be terminated with sixtydays notice and upon payment of a termination fee. Only 100 early terminations
would be accepted by QCI during each sixty-day period.
Not long after King began working with QCI, the Commissioner of the
Department of Commerce and Insurance issued a cease and desist order. The basis
of the order was that King and QCI were selling unregistered securities. King denied
that the sale-leaseback arrangements were securities and requested a hearing before
an administrative law judge. The judge applied the Hawaii Market test that was used
by the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals in State v. Brewer, 921 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1996), and found that the QCI program was an “investment contract,”
therefore, a security. The Supreme Court of Tennessee ultimately agreed with the
administrative law judge’s finding.
According to the Tennessee Supreme Court, the Hawaii Market test can be
applied liberally more easily than the Howey-Forman test used in federal and other
state jurisdictions. To find an “investment contract,” the test highlights four factors,
all of which must be present:
(1) An offeree furnishes initial value to an offeror, and (2) a portion
of this initial value is subjected to the risks of the enterprise, and (3)
the furnishing of the initial value is induced by the offeror's promises
or representations which give rise to a reasonable understanding that
a valuable benefit of some kind, over and above the initial value, will
accrue to the offeree as a result of the operation of the enterprise,
and (4) the offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical and
actual control over the managerial decisions of the enterprise.
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As the Tennessee Supreme Court noted, a liberal application of these elements will
increase the number of instances in which an “investment contract” will be found,
thereby allowing a better fulfillment of the purpose of the Tennessee securities
regulation: to protect investors.
While this decision demonstrates an appropriate application of the rules, the
detailed rationale used by the court in choosing one test over the other is the
cornerstone of the opinion. The court noted that the Hawaii Market is more in
keeping with public policy, and is not as judicially disputed as the Howey-Forman test,
thus allowing for more consistent interpretations. This case clearly establishes what
the law in Tennessee will be. As such, the court focuses on setting a strong
foundation for future issues through a clear, carefully reasoned rationale that is easily
understood.
TAX
Potential future debt not allowed for use as an offset against liabilities
transferred in a section 351 exchange. Seggerman Farms, Inc. v. Comm’r, 308 F.3d
803 (7th Cir. 2002).
By Christopher B. Fowler
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the tax court below, holding
“that where a taxpayer retains liability as a guarantor on debts transferred pursuant to
section 351, the plain language of section 357(c)…requires that the amount by which
transferred liabilities exceed[s] the taxpayer’s basis in the transferred assets must be
recognized as taxable gain [regardless of the personal guaranty].”
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue informed several taxpayers (the
“Seggermans”) of a deficiency based on tax liabilities incurred from transfers of
property subject to liabilities, made to Seggerman Farms Inc., (“Corporation”), in
exchange for stock. “The Corporation also assumed various farm-related liabilities
of [each of the taxpayers].” For each of the Seggerman’s transfers, “the dollar
amount of liabilities transferred to the Corporation exceeded the transferor’s
adjusted basis in transferred assets.” Because they signed commercial and personal
guaranties, the Seggermans were personally liable for the Corporation’s debt.
Normally, section 351 of the Internal Revenue Code (“Code”) allows this
type of exchange of property for stock without recognition of gain or loss by the
taxpayer. Thus, a taxpayer meeting the conditions of section 351 can usually
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exchange property for stock, and take a basis in the stock equal to the basis of the
transferred asset, so as not to realize any gain or loss on the transfer.
Citing section 351, the Seggermans did not report as income the amount by
which the liabilities transferred to the Corporation exceeded the adjusted basis in the
transferred assets. In other words, the Corporation took over the taxpayer’s debt,
which is considered income under the Code, but the Seggermans did not recognize it
as such because of section 351. However, section 357(c)(1) presents an exception to
the non-recognition provision of section 351 and states that where “the sum of the
amount of the liabilities assumed exceeds the total of the adjusted basis of the
property transferred pursuant to [a section 351] exchange,” “such excess shall be
considered as a gain.”
Despite the clear language of the Code, the Seggermans claimed that because
they remained personally liable on the Corporation’s debt, there was no taxable gain,
because they might in fact have to personally repay the loan amounts in the future.
The Seggermans argued the precedent cited by the Tax Court was outdated, and
urged that its interpretation was overly strict and mechanical, and should give way to
the “emerging equitable interpretation of section 357(c).” The court disagreed.
Whereas the cases cited by the Seggermans involved a loan receivable and a
promissory note respectively, representing real debt requiring an economic outlay,
the Seggermans themselves were at present, merely guarantors.
The Seggerman decision illustrates that taxpayers may not use merely potential
future debts, such as personal guaranties of loans, to offset liabilities transferred to a
corporation in section 351 exchanges. This decision also emphasizes the importance
of paying close attention to the Code when considering incorporation. If one
provision gives you a result that seems too good to be true, there is probably another
provision that you are missing.
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